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 Open source intelligence (OSINT) has always been strongly tied to the 
information and communication technology (ICT) of the day. This paper is an 
examination of the current state of OSINT as it relates to ICTs by looking at overarching 
problems that exist across multiple types of collection methods, as well as looking at 
specific cases where there are issues, such as China and the Middle East, and ending with 
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The subject of this paper is open source intelligence within the context of 
information and communication. Examination of current methodologies and recent policy 
changes identifies professional, structural, and ethical implications inherent in using and 
adapting to technological progress. From here, the goal is to see where information 
professionals fit in this process and the intelligence community as a whole.  The 
intelligence community is defined for our purposes as any of a number of groups whose 
goal it is to collect information, process it, and present it to policy makers in order to 
inform their decisions. Next, what is open source intelligence? The official government 
definition of intelligence is as follows. 
The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information 
concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about 
an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or 
understanding. (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000) 
As for the open source portion, this is not to be confused with the open source movement 
in computer software. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is collecting and analyzing 
anything that comes from publicly available documents or broadcasts. This covers 
newspapers, government documents, social media and broadcast media such as radio and 
television. OSINT is more related to collection than it is analysis. It can be thought of as 
collection without covert action (Davies, 2002). In the 1970s however, OSINT was 
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viewed as most useful when combined with other sources to create an all-encompassing 
form of intelligence because, in this role, it served to back up existing ideas put forward 
by other forms of intelligence (Davies, 2002). Information and communication 
technology (ICT) is defined here as the devices that allow for a person or a group of 
people to send a message to another person or group of people.  
 In the past, open source intelligence came in two main forms, print and broadcast 
media. The first was print including newspapers, government documents, and straight out 
propaganda documents. In many areas of the world they are still the only sources 
available. In cases like that of North Korea, this is by choice. Other times countries and 
people of a given area lack the technological means to produce much if any open source 
data in an online electronic format due to a lack of financing and infrastructure. A major 
issue with this type of intelligence in the past was that it mainly provided information 
after the fact. For example, if someone was trying to prevent a bombing, a newspaper 
article reporting on the aftermath of that bombing was not going to be useful in 
preventing the event. One of the goals of intelligence is prediction. Since OSINT did not, 
on the surface, appear to be as useful at predicting events it was seen as a lesser pursuit. 
 Open source intelligence focused more on giving the culture and governmental 
undercurrent of a particular area. If an intelligence officer wanted to get a general feel for 
what issues were important to another secluded country, propaganda was a good source 
for that type of intelligence. North Korea is a good current example of this idea. Official 
state documents and broadcasts from North Korea are often not viewed as accurate at 
face value.  Instead, they give other information such as what is currently being viewed 
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as an important topic by the government. If they are talking about having a plentiful 
supply of food for example, it may not be that they actually do but it does mean that food 
supply is important to their current thinking (Mercado, 2003).  
 During World War II radio broadcasting became a widely used form of open 
source intelligence. Radio broadcasting is not to be confused with military radio 
transmissions which fall under a different type of intelligence; the open source form is 
what the common person would listen to for news and entertainment such as President 
Roosevelt’s fireside chats. This area was monitored by the Foreign Broadcasting 
Information Service (FBIS), formerly the Foreign Broadcasting Intelligence Service 
(Mercado, 2003). The change from intelligence to information both indicates an increase 
in breadth and a decrease in credibility. Where intelligence was often viewed as a 
polished product, information was seen as raw data.  
 Throughout the Cold War print and broadcast monitoring continued to dominate. 
Television was added to radio in the broadcast realm. Open source officers tried to prove 
the usefulness of their highly accurate product, but other areas of the intelligence 
community were still perceived to have greater importance. Mercado (Mercado 2003) 
points out an example of this phenomenon.  “FBIS [Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service] and FDD [Foreign Document Division] officers began discerning signs of the 
Sino-Soviet split from their readings of propaganda material in the early 1950s.” Yet 
other sources, such as human intelligence or HUMINT, were taken more seriously even 
though they ended up with incorrect predictions more often. The result was one of the 
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early intelligence failures for the United States to predict the actions and status of 
communist countries. Open source intelligence remained the black sheep of the 
intelligence world until two things took place: the invention and commercialization of the 
internet and the September 11, 2001 attacks.  
 The internet and 9/11 caused the intelligence community, and those relying on the 
intelligence community to inform their decisions, to take a closer look at open source 
data. Why wasn’t it being used more thoroughly and often? Mercado (Mercado 2003) 
sums up the surface argument for the use of open source intelligence. “One can gather 
more open intelligence with greater ease and less cost than ever before.” The problem is 
that ease and low cost come with their own sets of problems such as information overload 
and ethical concerns like privatization.   
 While steps have been taken to make better use of the wealth of knowledge that is 
available to all, there is still resistance from the current system both ideologically and 
technically. “Too many people still reject OSINT as intelligence. Worse, too few are able 
to gather and exploit open sources. (Mercado, 2003)” That said, change is happening with 
regards to its use in the intelligence community. Open sources are now being taken more 
seriously because of new and developing technology, specifically the internet. While this 
may seem like something self-evident, the uses of this new medium were slow in coming 
and are slower still in implementation.  The internet has the ability to be a treasure trove 
of information that can be mined, analyzed, and shaped into useful intelligence products 
if properly handled in terms of both of policy and technology. No longer can or should 
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open source intelligence be viewed as an after-the-fact distribution of data on an event 
from a certain point of view. The internet allows publicly available data to be gathered 
before events occur to help make predictions just as well, if not better in some cases, as 
more secretive traditional types of intelligence gathering. Blogs, for example, while 
possibly falling into the pit of bias, are able to give real time, on the ground coverage of 
events that may or may not be reported by the news or picked up by HUMINT. Blogs, 
and most other internet based social media, allow analysts to collect information on the 
feelings and beliefs of the people in a particular region. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
forums, message boards, and other information media provide a wealth of open source 
data. The list of possibilities for open source intelligence gathering on the internet is long 
and dynamic. While information can be created online in an instant it can just as quickly 
disappear.  
 Information on the internet is fluid and temporary. It has a short half-life. If, for 
example, a blogger posts a piece and later decided she is unhappy with it she can remove 
it. Unless someone made a copy of that article in the time it was up, it is no longer 
available to the public. There are also space restrictions for online information. If that 
same blogger works for a major newspaper, the post may appear on the front page of 
their site for the first few days after it has been uploaded. After that initial time period it 
can be moved to a different location, be that the blogger’s personal space or storage, 
because it is less relevant to the current news cycle and front page space is needed. The 
article still exists at this point, but finding it becomes difficult. The path is changed and 
possibly broken. YouTube presents legal reasons for the disappearance of data. If a video 
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receives a complaint of copyright infringement it is removed whether or not this is 
actually the case.  YouTube has an appeals process, but it is used to get information 
restored not to prevent it from being removed. The internet is not a place of permanence.  
 The global positioning system is a tool used throughout the intelligence 
community. . Most people know it simply by its acronym GPS. GPS data is increasingly 
becoming publicly available. It is a feature of many social media sites by allowing the 
user to make updates from mobile devices detailing their location. In many cases these 
updates tag the GPS data of the user at the time of the post. Depending on the site, the 
user may not even be aware this is happening. The system may be automatically sending 
data unless the user chooses to opt out. Foursquare is a social media site that is built 
entirely on GPS data. Using this open source feature, tracking the location of an 
individual can be done through an internet browser without needing to go through the 
legal system to obtain a court order.   
 The traditional low-tech open source strategies of print and broadcast monitoring 
are effective when applied carefully to the nature of local information.  For example, 
North Korea uses print and broadcast media heavily due to their systematically censored 
and limited amount of information. On the other end of the continuum the United States 
uses the World Wide Web media heavily due to their deep internet penetration and 
commercialization of data dissemination. Even in industrially developed countries 
however print and broadcast mediums’ use generates meaningful data. For example, in 
the U.S., a 2012 Pew survey notes that 42% of the 65 and older population, a group with 
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significant political input, still do not use the internet (Pew Research Center, 2012).  Low 

















OSINT within the Broader ICT Framework  
Why They Matter in the Intelligence Community 
 During World War I and II, when the intelligence community in the United States 
was still getting its footing, there was a clear target on which to collect intelligence. 
Germany and its supporters were the focus. There was a name, a face, and borders. It was 
clear on whom to gather information. During the Cold War there was again a clear target 
with a name, face, and borders, and again collection of intelligence had a focus. The 
Soviet Union and other communist states were viewed as a threat about which 
intelligence products were needed in order to make informed policy decisions 
 In the current climate however, the entities concerning policy makers do not come 
in the form of nations. They come in the form of cells and networks. There are no 
borders. There is no face. Sometimes even the name is unclear. The formations 
concerning policy makers are also tech savvy.  
The security landscape was rapidly changing due to the amorphous nature 
of unconventional non-state threats such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
along with their increasing ability to use technology for nefarious means 
(Chomik, 2011).  
Technology is no longer cost prohibitive. Take flash drives as an example. Ten years ago 
a 256mb thumb drive cost roughly $150. A device capable of holding 44 times that much 
can be purchased for about $15 today. Those viewed as threats are now built like the 
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internet meaning that they are made without a central location so that if one node goes 
down the system can reroute and continue to function. Like the internet, they are made to 
withstand attack.  An arms race in the way that it occurred during the Cold War with the 
Soviet Union now makes little sense. Open source intelligence allows for the collection 
of data in a spread network style more akin to the way in which current organizations 
operate. More likely than an arms race is a race in terms of technology as that is more 
effective at combating and gathering information on decentralized and technologically 
advanced groups. This does not refer to a physical hardware race either, but instead one 
of software (Chomik, 2011). It is easier to infiltrate a network electronically than it is 
physically. Risk of things like double agents and loss of life can be reduced.  
 All of this matters because the availability of information is growing and 
changing. It does not live in the same place it did in the past. It is important to understand 
and adapt to this idea. Failure to do so will result in misinformed policy and mis-
allocation of resources. This will lead to failures such as missing an attack or losing out 







Essential OSINT Design Factors 
 Many of the issues facing ICT’s and OSINT deal directly with the information 
portion of the information and communication technology. Two prime examples of this 
are transparency and information overload. Transparency focuses on how visible the 
collection of intelligence, and the means of which it is collected, are to the parties 
involved. Information overload deals with the volume of data available to agencies and 
how its volume affects the quality and accuracy of intelligence products.   
Finding the Appropriate Level of Functional Transparency in the 
OSINT Data Collection Process  
 Transparency in intelligence gathering is a double edged sword. It is one that is 
difficult to decide which edge should be the most sharp. OSINT is as clear an example of 
this idea as it gets through its use of public data. While the internet can be used to find 
out more about a threat, the threat is able to use the same sources to find information 
about those they threaten.  It is a warped version of that old Friedrich Nietzsche quote. If 
you stare into the internet long enough, the internet stares back at you. In the intelligence 
community, transparency is a bi-product of the internet instead of a goal. “Transparency 
does not mean that everything is completely open, nor that it should be (O’Connell, 
2004).” The idea that it is unintentional raises the question of how much information 
should be allowed to be open source. It is a question that speaks to the very nature of 
information by looking closely at the purpose of its creators. The current system in the 
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United States is somewhere between transparent and opaque. The more open source 
intelligence is available and is used, the more transparent things become. It can be a 
frightening concept to those who have had a system in place for years that has 
intentionally been kept as opaque as possible. This explains why many within the 
intelligence community, and the government in general, hesitate to use some of the tools 
the internet affords.  
Neither the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 nor 
the 9/11 Commission Report devoted much time and attention to science 
and technology and their roles in U.S. intelligence (O’Connell, 2004).  
Add to this statement the changing attitude of the public in the direction of openness in 
information, and the scale tips further is favor of transparency.  Other INTs are also 
feeling pressure to become more open. The likelihood that it will be successful in other 
areas is not nearly as high, however. This is due to the fact that they do not need to be 
transparent to function. Higher opacity is necessary for other forms of intelligence, 
specifically HUMINT, to function at all. Open source intelligence depends on a certain 
degree of transparency, so that is where change will be seen first.  
Fear of transparency is understandable to a point. Whether or not intelligence 
should be transparent is not the issue here. The concern is how people have gone about 
making it transparent. One matter of contention is Wikileaks. This is not a condemnation 
of Wikileaks. It is not a question of whether Wikileaks is a champion of justice or evil 
incarnate. What matters is how Wikileaks went about making public the data it had in its 
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possession. It had a chilling effect on how intelligence agencies went about using ICTs 
and on the level of transparency that they were willing to put in place. By pushing the 
information out in the fashion it did, Wikileaks functioned like a parent teaching their 
child to swim by throwing them in the deep end of the pool. Sometimes that child will 
learn to swim. More often than not, that child will develop a fear of water. The 
intelligence community did not learn to swim (Schroeder, 2011). This fits with the 
concept held by many in the post-9/11 world. “In times of national or social threat, 
history has demonstrated that governments often expand surveillance and other powers at 
the expense of citizen rights (Strickland, Baldwin, & Justsen, 2006).” In addition to 
Wikileaks, which is arguable as a threat, there are some very real dangers present to those 
producing open source intelligence. For example, in 2011 alone four bloggers were 
murdered for putting out content dealing with the drug war in Mexico (Kessler, 2011).  
 
 Finding Functionality in OSINT Staff’s Ability to Manage Data 
Processing Information Overload 
 Information overload is when so much data is coming in or is available for use 
that it becomes difficult and overwhelming to organize and search for value. For decades 
people have struggled with deciding how to deal with all the information available to 
them. Along came the internet and that problem became exponentially worse. At least 
part of the problem is training. Intelligence officers often lack the training for dealing 
with large amounts of raw data.  
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The first challenge is that U.S. intelligence has been and remains 
overwhelmingly collection-centric, with insufficient attention paid to the 
creation of end-to-end (or sensor-to-analyst) architectures that will be 
needed to create useful and actionable intelligence (O’Connell, 2004).  
With the information provided by the internet available for use, the question of what to 
do with it becomes central. People and systems with the ability to sift through the data 
and pull out the portions with value for intelligence purposes are needed. 
 Through the lens of information overload, capitalist systems make for harder 
targets. There is more competition in websites, broadcast stations, blogs, etc. A country 
like North Korea makes an easier target since there is only a handful of OSINT to be had. 
Stephen Mercado makes the idea of gathering from a small pool sound like a positive 
point; however, this is only a positive if there is a limited number untrained staff 
available (Mercado, 2003). If there is a staff of individuals in place who are well trained 
in dealing with information overload, the intelligence that can be gained from the internet 
is sizable. However, Mercado’s point is not invalid. There is a point at which information 
overload is a more effective way to hide data than actually censoring it and keeping it 
secret. Eventually the volume of information will reach a level where this will be the 
case; however, currently and in the short-term future it is not.   
 Information overload is used as a counter to open source intelligence. Technology 
has not yet reached the point where software is able to comb the entirety of the internet 
and catch every piece of data that might be of use in creating an intelligence product. 
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Going back to the examples of North and South Korea for a moment, while South Korea 
has a larger amount of open source data available, it would be easier for information to 
slip by an agent trying to collect intelligence than it would if that same agent was looking 
at North Korea. In this scenario North Korea is a known unknown. When collecting 
intelligence from open sources, the collector can be aware that it is heavily edited and 
censored. The officer is aware of what it is they do not know. South Korea, along with 
the United States, is an unknown unknown to a certain extent. There is so much 
information being produced that it becomes hard to tell what is being missed (Mercado, 
2003). The idea of known unknowns and unknown unknowns has been around for a long 
time, but it was popularized again in recent years by Donald Rumsfeld. From there it 
began to be used as a joke. It is however a valid philosophical idea.     
 There is a split occurring within information overload between human overload 
and technological overload. In one direction is the traditional view which is an 
overwhelming amount of data regardless of format. It is an human issue. The information 
is available, but the user can not find what they are looking for within irrelevant data. The 
second area is technological information overload. In this situation, the problem is not 
finding specific information within a larger set, but instead it is problem processing 
available data through a system. An example of technological overload is the Chinese 
social media issue. There is screening program in place to make sure a post does not 
break Chinese law. If it is overwhelmed by the number and size of the posts coming in, 
this second form of information overload will occur (Elgin & Einhorn, 2006.) 
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 Information overload is an issue that is set in information, but affects technology. 
While it is a concern both online and off, the digital realm plays a large part in how it is 
handled. The next section focuses on the technological side of intelligence gathering and 
analysis and some of the major players and problems within it. By examining these areas 














The Technological Tools for Data Gathering, Data Processing, and Data 
Creation  
 There are various aspects of technology that effect OSINT from hardware to 
software. Social Media is the central open source intelligence tool. Another area that 
deserves mention is location data; however, this is a secondary focus. Location data 
illustrates where and how data is used and deals more with hardware.  Each of the 
technological areas covers certain, if not all, of the ideas of data gathering, data 
processing, and data creation. Data gathering is the collection of information created and 
put out in a place that is considered open source. Data processing is the ability of the 
tools to take information created elsewhere and form it into something useful for 
intelligence purposes. The tool may be designed to do this with or without the user’s 
intent. Data creation is the ability a tool gives its users to create raw information. Within 
the realm of software, the key form is social media. Location data focuses more on 
hardware. The capabilities of these products effect OSINT through their many to many 
interactions.  
Social Media 
 Social media covers data gathering, processing, and creation. Data is created by 
users, it is gathered in one place, and it is aggregated into groupings and categories. The 
focus here is on social media that is popular in the United States. For social networking 
the main example is Facebook. There are sites similar to Facebook that are more region 
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specific. In Russia there is V Kontakte. In Eastern Europe they have Odnoklassniki. 
China has its own social network called QZone (Cosenza, 2012). Twitter, a micro 
blogging site, is a beast all its own. In addition to Facebook and Twitter there are blogs 
and forums. Blogger, wordpress, and tumblr are just a few of the more popular blogging 
sites. 
 Can users of social media expect some level of privacy? Facebook, for example, 
has privacy controls. If a user adjusts them properly, they should be able to expect that 
certain, if not all, of the information they put up on the site will not be open to the public. 
On Twitter there is a very blunt setting to handle privacy. Users can protect their tweets 
or they can let them be. While Facebook still retains its usefulness in private mode, the 
value of Twitter decreases. The point of Twitter is to put something out there for others to 
read. If users are using Twitter as intended, which will be defined as using it with the 
default settings, can they expect any level of privacy? The answer on the surface is no. 
An unprotected Twitter account is the same as someone talking loudly on the street. 
Passersby will hear what is said. An unprotected account does not prevent people from 
thinking they should still have privacy. For the purposes of open source intelligence 
gathering, they potentially have a point. Intelligence gathering would then be akin to 
following someone around on the street with a tape recorder. It still might not be illegal, 
but the complaint of encroaching on privacy would be legitimatized.  
 With the example of Facebook specifically, can the data be considered publicly 
available? Even with privacy settings turned all the way up, it is still unclear who actually 
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owns the data users upload to the site. It is not possible for a user to delete a Facebook 
account. Accounts can be deactivated, but all users need to do to get back on is log back 
in. All the information originally entered is still there. If users can not get their data back, 
ownership has shifted to the company. At any time Facebook could sell, or give away, its 
user data to the highest bidder (Protalinski & Blue, 2012). If so that data would be useful 
intelligence. Is this open source? A newspaper is open source, but anyone wishing to read 
it will still have to pay for it so in that sense it is. Again to clarify this example of data 
control is as things are in the United States. Countries like Germany for example have 
different laws regarding the rights of citizens as they relate to corporations. Facebook has 
a high degree of global saturation which is both potentially positive and negative for the 
purposes of OSINT. On one hand a large reach creates a one stop shop. It is easier for 
intelligence agencies to create tools and algorithms for pulling out valuable data if the 
focus is on a single platform. On the other hand saturation on a global level creates 
possible problems. Facebook could decide to prevent the use of its data. In this way 
Facebook is unlike traditional public media. In the past once a newspaper is printed or a 
broadcast sent, it was available to everyone even if the creator decides after the fact that 
they wish it were not. In the current phase of technology the ability exists to pull back 
information. While Facebook is not the creator of the data, they do manage it and have 
control over its presentation once given to them. An agreement would need to be reached 
between collectors and Facebook. If such a deal were reached international laws would 
need to be considered. As of right now, there is a document proposing changes to 
Facebook’s data use policy. Within that document, there is a portion that states users can 
19 
choose whether or not to make a post private or public, but that it will not always be 
present and when it is not the post in question defaults to public. It is unclear what 
classifies a post as forced public or choice public. “Your settings do not control whether 
people can find you or a link to your timeline when they search for content they have 
permission to see, like a photo or other story you’ve been tagged in (Facebook, 2012).” 
Based on statements like this one, there are ways around privacy settings. Either way 
company policy and foreign law regarding social media sites is important for open source 
intelligence collectors so they know what data they can use and what they cannot as well 
as how to use it if they are allowed access. 
 Facebook allows for many to many public and many to many private interactions. 
Mass private messages can be sent out just as they can in e-mail. This is a feature that 
differentiates Facebook from other forms of social media. Twitter allows many to many 
interactions to occur publically, but not privately. Protecting tweets is still public because 
anyone a user has allowed to follow them can see what that user is saying to anyone else. 
The privacy setting allows for restricted public, but the data is still public. Forums and 
blogs are much the same way. Most social media does not allow for many to many 
private interactions to occur. Facebook and e-mail are the two main players that 
effectively are able to handle this type of communication, and e-mail is neither social 
media nor open source.  
 In the historical discussion earlier, the two areas where open source intelligence 
officers focused their efforts were print and broadcasting. Print and broadcast are 
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communication, but they are not interaction. A message is sent and a message is received.  
This is not the way ICTs work today. Today almost every type of communication 
technology out there sends messages in not just one, in many cases not even just two, but 
many directions.  
ICTs provide two-way channels for those who seek or receive information 
and also permit many-to-many communications. By incorporating 
feedback, political activity becomes more personalized and enhances the 
potential for engagement (Robbin, Courtright, & Davis, 2005).  
Like many of the areas of open source intelligence, sending messages to multiple 
recipients is a double edged sword. If more people are engaged in a conversation that can 
be publicly viewed, then there is more information for collectors to go through. 
Technologically there are numerous ways for information to travel many to many with 
feedback at this point in time. E-mail, blog entries, forum posts, and social media are just 
a few examples of places where someone could communicate to a large group of people 
and get feedback. Communicating to large groups also means there is a higher chance 
that something will be missed due to information overload.  Data traveling in multiple 
directions has its advantages. In an environment where broadcasting is the key form of 
dissemination, there is only one source to follow. If communication is occurring in other 
directions, it can be followed to other sources. Multiple data sources leads to unexpected 
avenues of collection.  
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 Many to many transmission begins to bring up the ethical and responsibility 
concerns involved with OSINT. Large numbers of messages can be sent and received by 
large numbers of people. Who has the right to collect these messages? Can the users 
expect any level of privacy? These are some of the considerations that will be discussed 
in the following section which centers on social justice. 
 Blogs are the online source that most clearly exemplifies the new face of open 
source intelligence. Blogs are the newspapers of the internet. They range from 
professional journalistic reports to the opinions of a single individual. Blogs can be used 
in the traditional sense similar to a newspaper. In fact, most major newspapers have their 
own blog at this point. Within professional blogs is information on what events are 
happening and how those events are being reported. On the other end of the spectrum 
there is the personal blog. Personal blogs could be anything from the thoughts and 
feelings of a farmer in a war torn region, a tween in Middle America talking about 
fashion, or a high level executive in a foreign country. Just from these examples, it is 
clear that some blogs are going to be more useful than others in compiling an intelligence 
report. By analyzing the personal blog, a general idea of the feelings of the common 
person can be obtained. It is also possible to see what the major news sources in an area 
are not reporting. Blogs are clearly open. Going back to the person on the street analogy, 
a blog is the equivalent to someone giving a speech to a crowd.  Blogs are so open in fact, 
that their transparency can be dangerous. Multiple bloggers have been killed for writing 
about the Mexican drug war since 2011 (Kessler, 2011).  
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 Blogs are also one of the major sources of information overload. In places like 
China this is becoming a problem. China’s system of law does not prevent the creation of 
blogs, but it does require posts to be screened before officially being posted online. Since 
anyone can have their own personal blog or even video blog, the amount of data requiring 
review is large. Video blogs are becoming a concern for China’s screening process (Elgin 
& Einhorn, 2006). Video files are larger and thus take longer to process from a 
technological standpoint. There is also more to analyze for content in video format than 
in text. Chinese law prohibits certain content. In text it can only be in the words. In video 
it could be in the words, the background, the physical actions that take place in the video, 
or a number of other things. While video makes things more difficult for China to screen, 
it also makes things more difficult for open source collectors and analysts to catch.  
 
Location Data 
 Many social media and mobile based applications now have the ability to add 
location data to a post. This location data covers data creation and gathering. Through a 
user’s IP address or GPS coordinates it is possible to get a close approximation of where 
they were at the time of the entry. Recently, a study was conducted on the behavior of 
those using such social media sites to see how much they were willing to share about 
their location. The study found that, “location information is preferably shared on a need 
to know basis, not broadcast (Wagner et al., 2010).” However, they go on to say that, 
“disclosing location at the granularity of city is perceived as disclosing nothing (Wagner 
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et al., 2010).” This shows a disconnect between what is now thought of as sharing and 
what was previously thought. Location information is important intelligence.  Knowing 
just the city someone is located in can be enough. If disclosing the city is seen as 
disclosing nothing then the first finding that location is shared on a need to know basis is 
not as important as it originally seems because disclosing the city is not seen as 
disclosing the location. Location data also allows for a rudimentary census. Using the 
information from a number of individuals it is possible to estimate the number of people 
in a given place at a given time.  
 Another finding dealt with how willing users are to share the location of others. It 
turns out they are not very willing. “Users are more cautious when sharing others’ 
location (Wagner et al., 2010).” People are more likely to tell someone where they are 
than they are to tell where someone else is located. The way the study conducted this 
portion used an extreme example, however. The researchers posed a question about 
giving the location of someone who was potentially having an affair. The finding was 
that people would err on the side of protecting the person whose presence was in 
question. In a more everyday case, it would be useful to see if the finding that people 
would withhold the location of another person still held true.  
 One reason certain participants in the study were reluctant to give up their 
location was that, “locations are associated with actions (Wagner et al., 2010).” This 
means if someone shows up as at the office on a social media site, people assume they are 
working. If people show up at a restaurant then they are eating dinner. If they are at home 
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then they are not busy. The point was made that showing up at home if you are working 
from home that day is a negative and that if they could say working from home instead of 
just at home then they would be more inclined to share that type of data (Wagner et al., 
2010). This is another bit of knowledge that OSINT agents, particularly analysts, should 
not overlook. Just because a person is at a certain place it does not mean that they are 














 Social Impact and Responsibility of OSINT in its use of ICT  
 When looking at open source data on the internet, it is easy to get mired down in 
the specifics of what can be done while overlooking what should be done. Intelligence 
collection is a broad area with many ethical shades of grey. By looking at the current 
system, it is apparent that there is a need for further examination in two main areas of 
social impact. This section focuses on the idea of social impact by looking at the 
responsibility and ethical concerns involved with creating and collecting information for 
intelligence products.  
Responsibility for Information Creation and Use  
 If dangerous information is put up online who is responsible for it? For that 
matter, who decides what information is dangerous? Say for example someone in Texas 
posts plans for a violent coup by Mexican drug cartels of the Mexican government. Who 
is responsible for this data? Is it the person who posted it? Is it the forum owner? Maybe 
it is the cartel’s responsibility. An intelligence officer who comes across this data must 
take these responsibilities into consideration when deciding how to handle this situation. 
If this is a crackpot attempting to incite violence the agent may act much differently than 
if this is an agent of one of the cartels putting out a call to arms. Online it can be hard to 
tell what the context is behind information. The context of the source is ambiguous. Other 
areas deal with the problem of uncertainty as well, take HUMINT for example, but none 
as often or as heavily as OSINT. Is anyone truly responsible for information? This 
essentially gets back to the “information wants to be free,” idea that often rises from 
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technology activists.  Protection of data is another area of responsibility that is important 
when talking about ICTs. To what degree is the creator of a site responsible for protecting 
the data of its users?  
The technological community needs to answer the criticism of science and 
technology studies, and must react to voices that highlight the ideological 
attractiveness of various alternatives to what is labeled a “western model” 
of science and technology (Resnyansky, 2009).  
 
Ethical Concerns of Collecting and Using Information  
 Each of the topics previously under discussion raises its own ethical problems. 
There is a delicate balance between the level of transparency that is deserved and that 
which is actually possible. By making information publicly available, there is a fear that 
whoever is giving out the data is putting his or herself at risk. The risk taker could be an 
individual, a corporation, a government, etc. Information still needs to be made available, 
however. When compiling an intelligence report for about a company someone is 
considering investing money in, that investor has a right to know certain things, like if the 
CEO is under indictment on embezzlement charges, in order to make an informed 
decision. People have the right to know what their elected officials are doing in their 
name. There is an amount of transparency that is necessary for a democratic society to 
function properly. There is also a time for a more opaque approach. Once a country has 
27 
engaged in war, whether a citizen agrees with the war itself or not, making troop 
movements and tactics public would only serve to make a dangerous situation more 
dangerous. The internet would make it easy for the military to keep citizens up to date on 
every move in real time. That does not mean that they should. The line is unclear. 
Wikileaks lands on the far end of the transparency spectrum. Wikileaks was and is the 
epitome of a loss of control (Schroeder, 2011). It is easier for governments and 
intelligence agencies to feel like control is in place when things are opaque. Just because 
Wikileaks believes in the ultimate level of transparency, does not mean that fear of it 
should cause intelligence agencies to go to the far opaque side.  
 Transparency does not automatically fix any issues that arise in the intelligence 
community nor does it instantly make them more ethical.  This concept is made clear in 
the system of überveillance. Überveillance is basically the idea of an ever present “big 
brother”. There are cameras placed throughout cities.  People are openly monitored 
electronically 24 hours a day, seven days a week. While the idea of überveillance itself is 
not new, at least as old as George Orwell’s 1984, the plausibility of it is. With the 
advancements that have been made recently in technology, it is not impossible that a 
world where an individual could be openly identified and tracked at all times could exist. 
This has been proposed in countries other than the United States due to legal and 
geographical reasons. Geographically, the United States is a big place and monitoring it 
in its entirety with cameras would not be feasible. In its own way, überveillance is 
transparent system. It does not hide what it does. It is open (Michael & Michael, 2007).     
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 On the issue of government versus the private sector, there has been talk of using 
private contractors to get around codes that prevent American intelligence agencies from 
collecting data on American citizens. In the online environment, borders are fluid. The 
ethical issues come in to play when deciding how to deal with this problem. Going to 
private contractors and simply circumventing the law is questionable at best. By using 
outside organizations to do the job government agencies cannot legal do is equivalent to 
that agency breaking the same law. The private sector has much less oversight. The 
general public has virtually no say in how private sector intelligence agencies conduct 
themselves. Oversight and accountability are important in all areas but few more so than 
the field of intelligence. A more ethical approach would be to reevaluate the existing 
policy to create a policy that works properly instead of using a temporary fix (Hosenball, 
2008).  
Cost polarization is another area with ethical problems. By allowing the best 
intelligence to be bought by those with the most money and leaving the rest to fend for 
themselves, a set group of moneyed individuals is kept in a position of power whether 
they deserve to be or not.  Wealthier countries have always been able to afford better 
intelligence. The problem comes in putting the ability to control intelligence in the 
private sector thus giving more political power to those with less oversight and 
accountability. While increased power in the private sector may happen either way, 
allowing it to happen and helping it to happen are completely different (Hosenball, 2008).  
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Ethical issues with OSINT occur in the real world through the policy set by 
governments and organizations and its implementation. Understanding issues with these 
areas helps to clarify the world in which the ethical issues discussed above live. The next 















Policy and Implementation of ICT use in Open Source Collection  
 The way in which ICTs and OSINT come together hinges on the policy of the 
government or organization using them and how that policy is implemented. The section 
begins with international concerns such as the “Great Firewall of China.” Next it moves 
on to the relationship between the government and the private sector both in terms of 
technology and intelligence production. The last portion looks at how the use of 
information professionals could improve the current system.  
International Considerations when Collecting OSINT 
 A very specific issue for open source intelligence when it comes to 
communication technology is China. The phrase “Great Firewall of China” is ubiquitous 
on the internet. This term refers to the technological system China has set in place to 
regulate and monitor the flow and type of information coming into and originating from 
its borders (Elgin & Einhorn, 2006). Much of this data is of the type that would be useful 
to OSINT officers. Evidence that China prevents that sort of information from leaving the 
country came in 2010 when Google reported a cyber-attack which emanating from China 
attempting to pull information from the accounts of various Chinese human rights 
activists. A new sort of war has even been postulated in the form of cyber-warfare could 
go so far as to cause a new sort of cold war. In this cold war, however, the race will not 
focus on nuclear armament, but instead on technological superiority. (Hartnett, 2011) 
This idea underlines the importance of harnessing the internet for intelligence. China’s 
official stance is that it does not intrude on political information. There is still ambiguity 
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around the topic of what is fair game, however. This uncertainty makes the job of the 
OSINT analyst difficult. It adds an additional layer to the criteria for trustworthiness in 
data. China has, in the past, done very well with the problem of information overload. It 
is theorized that there system will not be sustainable, however. There could be a time in 
the near future where China’s system no longer functions due to the sheer magnitude of 
data that is pressing against “the Great Firewall (Elgin & Einhorn, 2006).”  
 China also is a clear example of the disconnect between internet use and internet 
penetration. There are more people online in China than in any other country in the 
world. China has more than double the number of users than the second highest country 
which is the United States. This gives the impression that it would be easier to construct a 
picture of China than of the U.S. from open source data, censorship aside. However, 
while China has roughly 538 million users and the U.S. only has about 245 million, the 
penetration of the internet has only reached 40% of the population in China where in the 
U.S. it is at 78% (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2012a).  
 The Middle East is another area where open source intelligence is complicated 
with internet usage numbers. Iraq is still recovering from war. Before the Iraq war, there 
were guidelines in place as to how the government would allow the internet to be used. In 
2000 only .1% of the population was online. That number saw a jump after the 
government fell. Iraq went from 12,500 users in 2000 to 325,000 in 2010. This is still 
only 1% of the population. The amount of OSINT that can be gathered through internet-
based means is not going to be as helpful in creating reports on Iraq. Pre-war 
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governmental control mixed with post-war infrastructure damage has kept Iraq 
technologically behind.  Traditional methods would be more efficient for collecting 
intelligence (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2010a).  
 Iran has heavily censored access to the internet (Tait, 2006). There penetration 
numbers are similar to China with around 40% of the citizens having access. From the 
stand point of open source intelligence, this is a better number. It means there are over 33 
million Iranians who can go online (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2010b).  The problem 
here is censorship. Collecting intelligence on a censored system raises the question of 
which is better, a few sources from a place with little censorship, or many sources from a 
place with heavy censorship? Mercado argues for both and points out that the two are 
both valuable because they provide different types of information (Mercado, 2003). 
Looking at what type of data is being blocked by a country’s government is raw 
intelligence in itself.  
 Israel presents interesting data when viewing their internet usage through the lens 
of open source intelligence. Their internet penetration has actually decreased from 2008 
to 2012. A smaller percentage of the population uses the internet now than did four years 
ago. In 2008, 74% of the population was able to go online. Now that number has fallen to 
70% (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2012b). In all surrounding countries, including those 
with violent civil unrest such as Egypt and Syria, the penetration of the internet is steadily 
on the rise. Unexpected information like this is the type of data that would be good to 
share with other forms of intelligence. With data that is unclear, the all-sourced 
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intelligence method mentioned earlier can be helpful. In this context, the data on 
decreased penetration is confusing, but looked at along with other data it might make 
more sense (Davies, 2002). 
 
Government Intelligence interactions with the Corporate World  
 There is a disconnect between the government and the private sector when it 
comes to OSINT. The mismatch comes from discord on the subject of regulation. There 
are laws in place to keep governmental power in check when it comes to the use of 
technology to procure information. Because of the legal chasm that exists between the 
two, tools created by one may not be able to be used by the other. The new world of the 
internet is a corporate world.  A corporate world creates corporate tools. In doing so the 
world of government intelligence is alienated. The system in place encourages use of 
contractors instead of government agents.  
  Information and communication technology has reached a point where the 
private sector has outpaced the intelligence community in its abilities. Cost polarization is 
what occurs when the private sector offers certain information that has been collected, 
curated, and polished into a finished report at a premium from data that is available in a 
raw form for free or little cost.  Paying a contractor to collect and create finished 
intelligence has its benefits Chief among them are speed and ease. The problems that 
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arise from using contractors are cost and trust. Can the government really trust that the 
information is being presented in a factual non-biased fashion?   
 The free market drives and guides technological growth. What sells drives 
technology and what technology is available drives OSINT. Since the advent of the 
internet, communication has been the driving force. From the early days of forums and 
chat rooms to the modern tweets and wall posts, communicating in an entertaining and 
informative matter has driven the internet. None of these technologies are owned or 
regulated by governments the way that broadcasting was in the past. The difference in 
regulatory control has hampered the ability of government agencies to collect open 
source intelligence. There are different legal standards government agencies must abide 
by. In an article by Mark Hosenball, he discusses the use of private contractors to get 
around this block. OSINT is causing government intelligence agencies to reconsider their 
policies based on new technology.  
The charters of the C.I.A. and the defense intelligence agencies prohibited 
them from spying on American citizens, under the logic that the intrusive 
tactics needed to investigate foreign threats would violate constitutional 
rights if applied at home (Thompson, 2006).  
As the quote states the C.I.A. is prevented from spying on American citizens. The 
internet has globalized communication in such a way that it is hard to think of a social 
media site that is not going to have Americans involved. If tweets are monitored, 
Americans are monitored. If intelligence agencies go to Facebook they are looking at 
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Americans. The point is not that Americans dominate these areas. The point is that social 
media sites have a big enough presence to make it nearly impossible for someone to 
collect open source data from them without, unintentionally or otherwise, “spying” for 
lack of a better word on Americans. It is no longer possible for organizations like the 
Central Intelligence Agency to operate under the same policies they have in the past. 
Even the post-9/11 retooling of the intelligence community has failed to fix this problem 
(O’Connell, 2004). The choices for intelligence agencies are to go about collecting open 
source intelligence in a new way or change the policy in place. In the end a combination 
of the two will likely be necessary.  
 The idea of government versus private and old versus new policy becomes even 
more important if a cyber-cold war were to happen (Hartnett, 2011). There has been a 
fundamental shift in technological development since the formation of government 
intelligence agencies. At one time technology was developed to meet the needs of the 
government more so than that of the consumer. This has flipped in the last 20 years. 
Consumerism is the current driving force for advancement. During the Cold War, a 
government focus on weapons technology made an arms race was possible. In the current 
environment of consumer focus on information and communication technology, a 
physical arms race will no longer be valid. “Technology is a powerful factor that can 
either support necessary changes and provide useful solutions, or amplify undesirable 
trends and practices (Resnyansky, 2009).” Right now the tools for the intelligence 
community to function under these conditions do not exist.  
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Open Source Intelligence and Information Professionals  
 Information professionals are in a place to take a formative and integral role in 
open source intelligence gathering. To begin, they must look at their responsibilities 
within each of the above areas. One of the key goals across the board is education, 
specifically education of policy makers. It is their duty to make sure that technology like 
the internet is understood as something more than a series of tubes. It is also important to 
help others in the intelligence community understand how to deal with information. 
Educating intelligence agencies on how to deal with information will go a long way in 
helping to deal with information overload. Education needs to occur at all levels from 
local police departments to foreign policy makers.  
 Another area that information professionals need to cover is monitoring. 
Monitoring deals more heavily with technology than any other area due to the quick 
evolution of product that it covers. Information professionals must keep track of 
technologies as they are created and evolve. In order to do their job properly, it is 
necessary to have an understanding of both what new communication methods do and 
how they do it. Information professionals must also be up to date on how already existing 
technologies change. A perfect example of technology evolving is the cell phone. It went 
from calls to calls and texts to a mobile internet device all in the span of roughly ten 
years. Information Professionals need to keep track of this change so that they can figure 
out what it means in the world of intelligence. 
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Information professionals have been dealing with information overload for years. 
It is their responsibility to aid those collecting vast amounts of data for intelligence with 
the knowledge information professionals have accrued on the subject. One of the major 
skills an information professional possesses is the ability to curate a collection of useful 
data for a target audience. This is exactly the sort of skill that is needed in the current 
intelligence community. Information professionals have the task of both working at 
solving the problem themselves and teaching others what they can do to mitigate the 
overflow.  Most of what is out there floating around in the internet is garbage data. It is 
necessary for a curator to set up a system to go through and decide what is worth keeping 
and what can be thrown away. Information professionals allow governmental agencies to 
avoid going outside to a private contractor which will save both money and face in the 
long run. Many of the ethical questions can also be avoided. Along with the curation 
piece is location. Information professionals know where to look and, more importantly, 
how to look for information. This knowledge again saves time and money. The internet 
has useful intelligence data, but it is more useful if the searchers know where to search. 
Information professionals know where to dig. Reference librarians are especially skilled 
in this area so they bear an additional layer of responsibility.    
 There are some drawbacks to the entry of the library and information science field 
into the intelligence realm, however. Jin et al. points out that, while LIS and intelligence 
agencies already complement each other well, “LIS-oriented activities almost dominate 
collection and processing steps, while IA-oriented activities lead in the step to analysis 
(Jin & Bouthillier, 2012).” The take away from this is that information professionals do 
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not receive the skills to turn information into intelligence during their training. They are 
not a cure- all for the current system. If the intelligence community began taking students 
with information science backgrounds in after graduation there would be an increase in 
the number of courses dedicated to that subject matter. This is already happening in 
certain library programs across the nation. The University of Texas is a prime example of 
this. The Open Source Center of the CIA has gone so far as to set up an office in the main 
building of the School of Information. 
 The mentality of information professionals is slightly incompatible with the 
intelligence field. In this way they are tasked with bringing a different ethical viewpoint 
to the collection table. This mentality was made very apparent following September 11
th
. 
Government agencies requested the library records of patrons to analyze for potential 
threats to national security based on materials that had been checked out. In most cases 
librarians refused. Whether there is something about the library field that draws in 
individuals with this world view, or whether it is something learned throughout their 
course of study, there is a certain ethic that is instilled in library and information science 
professionals that runs counter to the traditional will of the intelligence community. This 







 Open source intelligence has grown in use and usefulness as a result of advances 
in the information and communication technology sector. The advent of the internet has 
served to strengthen the bond between the two and will only function to increase the 
value of information gained from this type of collection for the foreseeable future. Open 
source intelligence is not without its problems. Social media is a question mark. It has the 
potential to be an excellent source, but legal issues, internal policy changes, and public 
opinion keep it constantly up in the air. As technology continues to advance so do the 
dangers that it can pose. China and the Middle East in particular raise a few problems. 
China for its content controls and the Middle East for its connectivity issues in Iraq, 
censorship in Iran, and decreasing penetration in Israel. Transparency and information 
overload make it a double edged sword. So do those who pose a threat to security be it 
national or global. The internet has become a weapon of information. Unlike the nuclear 
arms race, however, there is an upside. It is useful both for intelligence and everyday life. 
The ability for new technology to allow for many to many communication is something 
that OSINT needs to capitalize on, but in a delicate manner so as to avoid a situation of 
überveillance. Location data in the form of GPS is becoming so omnipresent that such an 
elaborate system is not necessary anyway. Policy needs to be put into place to clearly 
decide who, if anyone is responsible for data. The issues of transparency and information 
overload presented could be on their way to being fixed with the employment of 
librarians in curating and locating OSINT. With a few changes they could even become 
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proficient at analysis as well. The final take away from this is that open source 
intelligence and information and communication technology are always going to 
influence one and other for better or worse. The value of OSINT should not be 
underestimated because as time progresses the importance and influence of the internet is 
only going to increase. There are problems with OSINT as it relates to ICTs, but they are 
not insurmountable. If all goes well OSINT can become the dominant INT. Maybe then it 
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